Collateral and reputation in a model of strategic defaults
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Publication:6087280
DOI10.1016/j.jedc.2023.104755zbMath1526.91028OpenAlexW4387246545MaRDI QIDQ6087280
Publication date: 15 November 2023
Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2023.104755
Cites Work
- Collateral equilibrium. I: A basic framework
- Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
- Reputation and imperfect information
- Belief-based refinements in signalling games
- Leverage dynamics and credit quality
- Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
- The Consequences of Mortgage Credit Expansion: Evidence from the U.S. Mortgage Default Crisis*
- Default and Punishment in General Equilibrium1
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