Financial and operational creditors in bankruptcy resolution: a general equilibrium approach under three game-theoretic division rules with an application to India

DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2023-0031MaRDI QIDQ6131136zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Rohit Prasad, S. Veena Iyer

Publication date 4 April 2024

Published in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2023-0031

zbMATH Keywords

general equilibriumIndiafinancial creditorsgame-theoretic bankruptcy division rulesoperational creditors

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Noncooperative games (91A10) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

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Cites work

• Default and Punishment in General Equilibrium1
• Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud
• The bankruptcy problem: A cooperative bargaining approach
• The three musketeers: four classical solutions to bankruptcy problems.
• Trade credit and the propagation of corporate failure: an empirical analysis

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