Financial and operational creditors in bankruptcy resolution: a general equilibrium approach under three game-theoretic division rules with an application to India
DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2023-0031OpenAlexW4387017753MaRDI QIDQ6131136FDOQ6131136
Authors: Rohit Prasad, S. Veena Iyer
Publication date: 4 April 2024
Published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2023-0031
Recommendations
general equilibriumIndiafinancial creditorsgame-theoretic bankruptcy division rulesoperational creditors
Applications of game theory (91A80) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Noncooperative games (91A10) General equilibrium theory (91B50)
Cites Work
- Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud
- The three musketeers: four classical solutions to bankruptcy problems.
- Default and Punishment in General Equilibrium1
- The bankruptcy problem: A cooperative bargaining approach
- Trade credit and the propagation of corporate failure: an empirical analysis
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