Expectational equilibria in many-to-one matching models with contracts

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2024.105799MaRDI QIDQ6203356FDOQ6203356

P. Jean-Jacques Herings

Publication date: 27 March 2024

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

matchingcompetitive equilibriumstable outcomesexpectational equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50) Matching models (91B68) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

Cites Work

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Cited In (1)

• Equilibria in matching markets with soft and hard liquidity constraints

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