Expectational equilibria in many-to-one matching models with contracts

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2024.105799MaRDI QIDQ6203356zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors P. Jean-Jacques Herings

Publication date 27 March 2024

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

zbMATH Keywords

matchingcompetitive equilibriumstable outcomesexpectational equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50) Matching models (91B68) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

Recommendations

• Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets
• Equilibrium and matching under price controls
• On the correspondence of contracts to salaries in (many-to-many) matching
• Competitive equilibria in matching models with financial constraints

Cites work

• A Fixed-Point Approach to Stable Matchings and Some Applications
• A dynamic auction for differentiated items under price rigidities
• A note on job matching with budget constraints
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Competitive equilibria in matching models with financial constraints
• Continua of underemployment equilibria reflecting coordination failures, also at Walrasian prices
• Credible group stability in many-to-many matching problems
• Default and Punishment in General Equilibrium1
• Equilibria and Indivisibilities: Gross Substitutes and Complements
• Equilibrium and matching under price controls
• Existence of an Exchange Equilibrium under Price Rigidities
• Indivisibilites dans une Economie d'Echanges
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• Job matching with heterogeneous firms and workers
• Neo-Keynesian Disequilibrium Theory in a Monetary Economy
• Non-manipulable house allocation with rent control
• On cores and indivisibility
• On the Role of Money in the Process of Exchange and the Existence of a Non- Walrasian Equilibrium
• Price controls, non-price quality competition, and the nonexistence of competitive equilibrium
• Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
• Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts
• The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
• The assignment game. I: The core
• The central assignment game and the assignment markets
• The communication requirements of social choice rules and supporting budget sets
• The implementation duality
• Tick size, price grids and market performance: stable matches as a model of market dynamics and equilibrium
• Trading networks with frictions
• Walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes

Cited in

(1)

• Equilibria in matching markets with soft and hard liquidity constraints

This page was built for publication: Expectational equilibria in many-to-one matching models with contracts

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6203356)