Non-Manipulable House Allocation With Rent Control
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Publication:4615852
DOI10.3982/ECTA10893zbMath1419.91393OpenAlexW2112464238MaRDI QIDQ4615852
Tommy Andersson, Lars-Gunnar Svensson
Publication date: 29 January 2019
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta10893
rationingconstrained efficiencyhouse allocationnon-manipulabilityrationing price equilibriumrent control
Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68)
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