How to efficiently allocate houses under price controls?
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Publication:500551
DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2015.03.013zbMath1321.91059OpenAlexW2740342060MaRDI QIDQ500551
Zaifu Yang, Tommy Andersson, Dong-Mo Zhang
Publication date: 5 October 2015
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://project.nek.lu.se/publications/workpap/papers/wp14_24.pdf
Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Related Items (2)
Strategy-proof house allocation with price restrictions ⋮ A multi-item auction with budget-constrained bidders and price controls
Cites Work
- Characterization of the Walrasian equilibria of the assignment model
- Constrained suboptimality when prices are non-competitive
- On cores and indivisibility
- A necessary and sufficient condition for non-emptiness of the core of a non-transferable utility game
- A dynamic auction for differentiated items under price rigidities
- The assignment game. I: The core
- Assignment Problems and the Location of Economic Activities
- Equilibrium under Rigid Prices with Compensation for the Consumers
- Existence of an Exchange Equilibrium under Price Rigidities
- Two examples of equilibria under price rigidities and quantity rationing
- Non-Manipulable House Allocation With Rent Control
- The Core of an N Person Game
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