A dynamic auction for differentiated items under price rigidities
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Publication:1934754
DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2007.07.002zbMATH Open1255.91172OpenAlexW3125876176MaRDI QIDQ1934754FDOQ1934754
Authors: Zaifu Yang, Dolf Talman 
Publication date: 29 January 2013
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://pure.uvt.nl/portal/en/publications/a-dynamic-auction-for-differentiated-items-under-price-rigidities(34bbf7ff-4bbf-499b-bfd4-383e8e817c0a).html
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Cites Work
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- Job matching with heterogeneous firms and workers
- Equilibrium under Rigid Prices with Compensation for the Consumers
- Existence of an Exchange Equilibrium under Price Rigidities
- On supply-constrained equilibria
- The Computation of a Continuum of Constrained Equilibria
- Unemployment equilibrium in an economy with linked prices
- Supply-constrained equilibria in economies with indexed prices
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- How to efficiently allocate houses under price controls?
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- Auction design for the allocation of carbon emission allowances to supply chains via multi-agent-based model and Q-learning
- An extension of Ausubel's auction for heterogeneous discrete goods
- Computing a Walrasian Equilibrium in Iterative Auctions with Multiple Differentiated Items
- Ironing in Dynamic Revenue Management: Posted Prices & Biased Auctions
- Sequential rules for house allocation with price restrictions
- Expectational equilibria in many-to-one matching models with contracts
- An efficient multi-item dynamic auction with budget constrained bidders
- Equilibrium and matching under price controls
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