The problem of multiple commons: a market design approach
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2018.10.007zbMATH Open1419.91401OpenAlexW2584867711WikidataQ128965213 ScholiaQ128965213MaRDI QIDQ1735792FDOQ1735792
Authors: Ryan Tierney 
Publication date: 29 March 2019
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.10.007
Recommendations
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Games involving graphs (91A43)
Cites Work
- The assignment game. I: The core
- A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- On cores and indivisibility
- Minimum partition of a matroid into independent subsets
- The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
- Non-manipulable house allocation with rent control
- Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Criteria of Justice
- Sets in excess demand in simple ascending auctions with unit-demand bidders
- Multi-item Vickrey-English-Dutch auctions
- Simple strategy-proof approximately Walrasian mechanisms
- Evaluating assignment without transfers: a market perspective
- The relation between monotonicity and strategy-proofness
- Advances in mathematical economics. Vol. 6
Cited In (6)
- Mechanism design for a solution to the tragedy of commons
- The commons with capital markets
- Dynamic mechanism design for a global commons
- The combination of two tragedies: commons and anticommons tragedies
- Social welfare in search games with asymmetric information
- Distributing the Benefits from the Commons: A Square-Root Formula
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