Dynamic mechanism design for a global commons

DOI10.1111/IERE.12234zbMATH Open1403.91267OpenAlexW2753430738MaRDI QIDQ5370529FDOQ5370529

Authors: Rodrigo Harrison, Roger Lagunoff 

Publication date: 20 October 2017

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs4786969000000000831.pdf

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zbMATH Keywords

perfect Bayesian equilibriaopen access resourcedynamic mechanismsglobal commons

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Cited In (1)

• Mechanism design for a solution to the tragedy of commons

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