Dynamic mechanism design for a global commons

DOI10.1111/IERE.12234MaRDI QIDQ5370529zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Rodrigo Harrison, Roger Lagunoff

Publication date 20 October 2017

Published in International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs4786969000000000831.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

perfect Bayesian equilibriaopen access resourcedynamic mechanismsglobal commons

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Recommendations

• An efficient dynamic mechanism
• Multiagent mechanism design without money
• Dynamic mechanism design: a Myersonian approach
• Mechanism design for a solution to the tragedy of commons
• The problem of multiple commons: a market design approach

Cited in

(1)

• Mechanism design for a solution to the tragedy of commons

This page was built for publication: Dynamic mechanism design for a global commons

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q5370529)