Why higher punishment may reduce deterrence

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2009.04.003MaRDI QIDQ1046216zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Eberhard Feess, Ansgar Wohlschlegel

Publication date 21 December 2009

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2009.04.003

zbMATH Keywords

deterrence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical psychology (91E99) Stochastic models in economics (91B70) Mathematical sociology (including anthropology) (91D99)

Recommendations

• Marginal deterrence when offenders act sequentially
• Deterrence: increased enforcement versus harsher penalties
• Celerity of punishment and deterrence: the impacts of discounting and present bias
• Overdeterrence of repeat offenders when penalties for first-time offenders are restricted
• The certainty versus the severity of punishment, repeat offenders, and stigmatization

Cited in

(5)

• Deterrence: increased enforcement versus harsher penalties
• Can early release both reduce prison costs and increase deterrence?
• Deterrence by collective punishment may work against criminals but never against freedom fighters
• The certainty versus the severity of punishment, repeat offenders, and stigmatization
• More punishment, less default?

This page was built for publication: Why higher punishment may reduce deterrence

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1046216)