Marginal deterrence when offenders act sequentially
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Publication:485741
DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2014.07.023zbMATH Open1302.91172OpenAlexW1975673750MaRDI QIDQ485741FDOQ485741
Authors: Tim Friehe, Thomas J. Miceli 
Publication date: 14 January 2015
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://media.economics.uconn.edu/working/2014-09.pdf
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Cited In (8)
- Deterrence: increased enforcement versus harsher penalties
- Escalating penalties for repeat offenders: a note on the role of information
- A model of criminal sanctions that incorporate both deterrence and incapacitation
- An extension of the Becker proposition to non-expected utility theory
- Deterrence by collective punishment may work against criminals but never against freedom fighters
- Overdeterrence of repeat offenders when penalties for first-time offenders are restricted
- Why higher punishment may reduce deterrence
- The certainty versus the severity of punishment, repeat offenders, and stigmatization
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