Escalating penalties for repeat offenders: a note on the role of information

DOI10.1007/S00712-009-0058-YMaRDI QIDQ2272175zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Tim Friehe

Publication date 6 August 2009

Published in Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-009-0058-y

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10) Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• Optimal penalties for repeat offenders -- the role of offence history
• Marginal deterrence when offenders act sequentially
• Overdeterrence of repeat offenders when penalties for first-time offenders are restricted
• The option value of record-based sanctions
• Sophisticated enforcement and adaptive offenders

Cited in

(5)

• The option value of record-based sanctions
• Marginal deterrence when offenders act sequentially
• Overdeterrence of repeat offenders when penalties for first-time offenders are restricted
• Self-reporting and ex post asymmetric information.
• Optimal penalties for repeat offenders -- the role of offence history

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