Optimal penalties for repeat offenders -- the role of offence history
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Publication:1675029
DOI10.1515/bejte-2014-0098zbMath1375.91200MaRDI QIDQ1675029
Bianca Rundshagen, Alfred Endres
Publication date: 26 October 2017
Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/bejte.2016.16.issue-2/bejte-2014-0098/bejte-2014-0098.xml?format=INT
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Optimal penalties for repeat offenders -- the role of offence history, The option value of record-based sanctions
Cites Work
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