On Moral Hazard and Insurance

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Publication:4898342

DOI10.2307/1884469zbMath1254.91280OpenAlexW2152734002MaRDI QIDQ4898342

Steven Shavell

Publication date: 1 January 2013

Published in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1884469




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