Nonlinear incentive provision in Walrasian markets: a Cournot convergence approach

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2004.01.003zbMath1120.91018OpenAlexW2065619026MaRDI QIDQ1764650

Martin F. Hellwig

Publication date: 22 February 2005

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0028-6E58-9

zbMATH Keywords

Moral hazardIncentive contractingRational-expectations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Equilibria in monopolistically competitive insurance markets
• A characterization of perfectly competititve economies with production
• Perfect competition, the profit criterion, and the organization of economic activity
• The limit points of monopolistic competition
• The no-surplus condition as a characterization of perfectly competitive equilibrium
• On normal hazard in general equilibrium theory
• Cournot and Walras equilibrium
• Competitive equilibria with asymmetric information
• Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
• Monopolistic Competition in a Large Economy with Differentiated Commodities
• Informed Speculation with Imperfect Competition
• An Introduction to the Theory of Rational Expectations Under Asymmetric Information
• On the Foundations of the Theory of Monopolistic Competition
• The Existence of Futures Markets, Noisy Rational Expectations and Informational Externalities
• On Moral Hazard and Insurance
• Equilibrium in a Reinsurance Market
• Moral hazard and general equilibrium in large economies

This page was built for publication: Nonlinear incentive provision in Walrasian markets: a Cournot convergence approach