scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3653916
From MaRDI portal
Publication:3853475
Cited in
(18)- Repeated insurance contracts and moral hazard
- Efficient outcomes in a repeated agency model without discounting
- A note on reactive equilibria in the discounted prisoner's dilemma and associated games
- The interaction of implicit and explicit contracts in repeated agency
- Optimal principal agent contracts for a class of incentive schemes: A characterization and the rate of approach to efficiency
- Optimal penalties for repeat offenders -- the role of offence history
- Graduated punishment is efficient in resource management if people are heterogeneous
- On the complexity of repeated principal agent games
- Escalating penalties for repeat offenders: a note on the role of information
- Dynamic incentive contracts in multiple penalty systems with no-commitment to tenure-track auditing
- The option value of record-based sanctions
- Self-evident events and the value of linking
- Optimal sentencing with recurring crimes and adjudication errors
- Nonrecursive dynamic incentives: a rate of convergence approach
- Repeated delegation
- Dynamic incentive contracts under no-commitment to periodic auditing and a non-retrospective penalty system
- Collusion enforcement with private information and private monitoring
- Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships
This page was built for publication:
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q3853475)
