Dynamic incentive contracts in multiple penalty systems with no-commitment to tenure-track auditing
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Publication:2642565
Recommendations
- Dynamic incentive contracts under no-commitment to periodic auditing and a non-retrospective penalty system
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- Payoff implications of incentive contracting
- The efficiency of bonus-or-terminate incentive schemes under subjective evaluations
- Career concerns and performance reporting in optimal incentive contracts
Cites work
- Avoiding tax avoidance: A (repeated) game-theoretic approach
- Collusion in Hierarchical Agency
- Commitment and Fairness in a Dynamic Regulatory Relationship
- Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case
- Dynamic incentive contracts under no-commitment to periodic auditing and a non-retrospective penalty system
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3653916 (Why is no real title available?)
- Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
- Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
- Samurai Accountant: A Theory of Auditing and Plunder
- The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts
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