Dynamic incentive contracts in multiple penalty systems with no-commitment to tenure-track auditing

DOI10.1007/S00712-006-0241-3zbMath1206.91055OpenAlexW1991667361MaRDI QIDQ2642565

Hsiao-Chi Chen, Shi-Miin Liu

Publication date: 17 August 2007

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-006-0241-3

zbMATH Keywords

penalty schemesdynamic incentive contracttenure-track auditing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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• Samurai Accountant: A Theory of Auditing and Plunder
• The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts
• Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
• Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case
• Collusion in Hierarchical Agency

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