Dynamic incentive contracts in multiple penalty systems with no-commitment to tenure-track auditing
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Publication:2642565
DOI10.1007/S00712-006-0241-3zbMATH Open1206.91055OpenAlexW1991667361MaRDI QIDQ2642565FDOQ2642565
Authors: Hsiao-Chi Chen, Shi-Miin Liu 
Publication date: 17 August 2007
Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-006-0241-3
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Cites Work
- Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
- Samurai Accountant: A Theory of Auditing and Plunder
- Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
- Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case
- Collusion in Hierarchical Agency
- Avoiding tax avoidance: A (repeated) game-theoretic approach
- The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Commitment and Fairness in a Dynamic Regulatory Relationship
- Dynamic incentive contracts under no-commitment to periodic auditing and a non-retrospective penalty system
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