Collusion in Hierarchical Agency
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Publication:5287211
DOI10.2307/2951721zbMATH Open0775.90128OpenAlexW1988558611MaRDI QIDQ5287211FDOQ5287211
Authors: Fred Kofman, Jaques Lawarrée 
Publication date: 19 August 1993
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/47051
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Theory of organizations, manpower planning in operations research (90B70) Hierarchical systems (93A13)
Cited In (17)
- Fiscal policy and corruption
- Vertical relationships with hidden interactions
- Sweet lemons: mitigating collusion in organizations
- Monitoring and incentives under multiple-bank lending: the role of collusive threats
- Corporate governance, stakeholder power, and executive compensation
- On the efficiency of hurdle rate-based coordination mechanisms
- Reauditing and dual sourcing? Implication of collusion deterrence measures in ethical sourcing
- Mechanism design with collusive supervision
- Dynamic incentive contracts in multiple penalty systems with no-commitment to tenure-track auditing
- Bargaining and collusion in a regulatory relationship
- Collusion, shading, and optimal organization design
- Corruption and bicameral reforms
- On monitoring and collusion in hierarchies
- Supervisory efficiency and collusion in a multiple-agent hierarchy
- Ex-ante regulation, ex-post regulation, and collusion
- Capital regulation and auditing
- Dynamic incentive contracts under no-commitment to periodic auditing and a non-retrospective penalty system
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