Collusion in Hierarchical Agency

DOI10.2307/2951721MaRDI QIDQ5287211zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Fred Kofman, Jaques Lawarrée

Publication date 19 August 1993

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/47051

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Theory of organizations, manpower planning in operations research (90B70) Hierarchical systems (93A13)

Cited in

(17)

• Sweet lemons: mitigating collusion in organizations
• Monitoring and incentives under multiple-bank lending: the role of collusive threats
• Fiscal policy and corruption
• Vertical relationships with hidden interactions
• Corporate governance, stakeholder power, and executive compensation
• On the efficiency of hurdle rate-based coordination mechanisms
• Reauditing and dual sourcing? Implication of collusion deterrence measures in ethical sourcing
• Mechanism design with collusive supervision
• Dynamic incentive contracts in multiple penalty systems with no-commitment to tenure-track auditing
• Bargaining and collusion in a regulatory relationship
• Collusion, shading, and optimal organization design
• Corruption and bicameral reforms
• On monitoring and collusion in hierarchies
• Supervisory efficiency and collusion in a multiple-agent hierarchy
• Ex-ante regulation, ex-post regulation, and collusion
• Capital regulation and auditing
• Dynamic incentive contracts under no-commitment to periodic auditing and a non-retrospective penalty system

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