Collusion in Hierarchical Agency
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Publication:5287211
DOI10.2307/2951721zbMath0775.90128OpenAlexW1988558611MaRDI QIDQ5287211
Publication date: 19 August 1993
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/47051
Hierarchical systems (93A13) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Theory of organizations, manpower planning in operations research (90B70)
Related Items (15)
Corruption and bicameral reforms ⋮ Dynamic incentive contracts in multiple penalty systems with no-commitment to tenure-track auditing ⋮ Bargaining and collusion in a regulatory relationship ⋮ Supervisory efficiency and collusion in a multiple-agent hierarchy ⋮ Collusion, shading, and optimal organization design ⋮ Sweet lemons: mitigating collusion in organizations ⋮ Ex-ante Regulation, Ex-post Regulation, and Collusion ⋮ Monitoring and incentives under multiple-bank lending: the role of collusive threats ⋮ Corporate governance, stakeholder power, and executive compensation ⋮ Capital regulation and auditing ⋮ On the efficiency of hurdle rate-based coordination mechanisms ⋮ Fiscal policy and corruption ⋮ Mechanism design with collusive supervision ⋮ On monitoring and collusion in hierarchies ⋮ Dynamic incentive contracts under no-commitment to periodic auditing and a non-retrospective penalty system
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