Deterrence by collective punishment may work against criminals but never against freedom fighters

DOI10.3390/G12020041MaRDI QIDQ2052536zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Friedel Bolle

Publication date 26 November 2021

Published in Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3390/g12020041

zbMATH Keywords

collective punishmentpublic badpublic goodresistance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Public goods (91B18)

Review text

Summary: The main goal of collective punishment (CP) is the deterrence of future ``wrong-doing by freedom fighters or terrorists, protesters against an authoritative government, polluters, students playing pranks on their teacher, football teams lacking enthusiasm, or soldiers showing cowardice to the enemy. CP could consist of the lockout of workers, additional training units for football teams, increased control of athletes and firms, up to the shooting of fellow villagers of assassins. I investigate two classes of problems. In one class, resistance against an authority is individually costly, but enough resistance can be successful (the production of a public good, for example, higher wages after a strike). In the other case, ``resistance is individually profitable (a criminal activity as pollution) and enough ``resistance produces a public bad. We find that, in the first situation, the announcement of CP never decreases the level of resistance. In the second situation, CP can be successful.

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Cites work

• Choosing the Carrot or the Stick? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations
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• Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
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• When will party whips succeed? Evidence from almost symmetric voting games

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