Optimal offending in view of the offender's criminal record

zbMATH Open0949.91009MaRDI QIDQ1806629FDOQ1806629

Martin Zalesak, Thomas Fent, Gustav Feichtinger

Publication date: 8 November 1999

Published in: CEJOR. Central European Journal of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

sensitivity analysisoptimal controllaw enforcementeconomics of crimepunishment policysaddle point stability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Economic growth models (91B62) Application models in control theory (93C95)

Cited In (5)

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• WHEN AND HOW THE PUNISHMENT MUST FIT THE CRIME
• Analysis of current penalty schemes for violations of antitrust laws
• Marginal deterrence when offenders act sequentially
• Determination of optimal penalties for antitrust violations in a dynamic setting

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