Collusive behavior under a leniency program

DOI10.1007/S00712-010-0140-5MaRDI QIDQ601784zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ikuo Ishibashi, Daisuke Shimizu

Publication date 29 October 2010

Published in Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-010-0140-5

zbMATH Keywords

antitrustrepeated gamescollusionlaw enforcementleniency program

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Recommendations

• The effect of leniency programs on endogenous collusion
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Cites work

• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
• A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, II: Price Competition, Kinked Demand Curves, and Edgeworth Cycles

Cited in

(7)

• Are leniency programs too generous?
• Blowing the whistle
• Leniency programs under demand uncertainty: cartel stability and the duration of price wars
• Collusion, renegotiation and implementation
• Mixed oligopolies and collusion
• The effect of leniency programs on endogenous collusion
• The effects of leniency on cartel pricing

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