Tacit collusion and market concentration under network effects
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(24)- A note on cartel stability and endogenous sequencing with tacit collusion
- Debt as a collusive device in an oligopoly supergame
- Collusion under financial constraints: Collusion or predation when the discount factor is near one?
- Compatibility, network effects, and collusion
- Collusion in a differentiated duopoly with network externalities
- Sustainable collusion on separate markets
- Taxation and the sustainability of collusion with asymmetric costs
- Collusion between non-differentiated two-sided platforms
- Non-Archimedean game theory: a numerical approach
- Tacit collusion with consumer preference costs
- Understanding and preventing tacit collusion among telecommunication operators
- Collusive Market Structure Under Learning-By-Doing and Increasing Returns
- Intertemporal Product Choice and Its Effects on Collusive Firm Behavior
- Competition versus collusion: the impact of consumer inertia
- THE EFFECTS OF LENIENCY PROGRAMS AND FINES ON CARTEL STABILITY
- Pricing strategy and collusion in a market with delay sensitivity
- Note on collusion with network externalities in price versus quantity competition
- A theoretical analysis of collusion involving technology licensing under diseconomies of scale
- Network externalities and downstream collusion under asymmetric costs: a note
- Collusive stability with relative performance and network externalities
- A dynamic analysis of collusive networks
- Evolution of a collusive price in a networked market
- Collusive stability of cross-holding with cost asymmetry
- Tacit collusion in differentiated Cournot games
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