Debt as a collusive device in an oligopoly supergame

DOI10.1007/BF01226828MaRDI QIDQ1378874zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Dick Damania

Publication date 24 March 1998

Published in Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

financial structureoligopoly supergamerepeated oligopoly gamestochastic demand fluctuations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Recommendations

• The strategic effects of long-term debt in imperfect competition
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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 53256 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3599745 (Why is no real title available?)
• Extremal equlibria of oligopolistic supergames
• Finitely Repeated Games
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values

Cited in

(2)

• The strategic role of dividends and debt in markets with imperfect competition
• The strategic effects of long-term debt in imperfect competition

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