Collusive stability with relative performance and network externalities

DOI10.3390/G15030021MaRDI QIDQ7036079zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Yi-Shan Lu, Chien-Shu Tsai, Jen-Yao Lee, Chung-Yang Lee

Publication date 28 January 2025

Published in Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3390/G15030021

zbMATH Keywords

network externalitiesrelative performancestability of collusion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Cites work

• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
• Collusion in a differentiated duopoly with network externalities
• Collusive stability of cross-holding with cost asymmetry
• Cournot vs. Bertrand under relative performance delegation: implications of positive and negative network externalities
• Duopoly supergames with product differentiation
• Justifiable punishments in repeated games
• Network externalities and downstream collusion under asymmetric costs: a note
• Network externalities and process R\&D: a Cournot-Bertrand comparison
• Note on collusion with network externalities in price versus quantity competition
• On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
• Repeated Cournot model with justifiable punishments
• Strategic delegation under price competition and network effects
• Tacit collusion and market concentration under network effects

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