Cournot vs. Bertrand under relative performance delegation: implications of positive and negative network externalities

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2015.02.007zbMath1331.91118OpenAlexW1981392680MaRDI QIDQ491309

Rupayan Pal

Publication date: 24 August 2015

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2015.02.007

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (11)

Equilibrium further studied for combined system of Cournot and Bertrand: a differential approach ⋮ Network externalities and process R\&D: a Cournot-Bertrand comparison ⋮ Collusion in a differentiated duopoly with network externalities ⋮ Downstream rivals' competition, bargaining, and welfare ⋮ Endogenous expectations management with network effects: a note ⋮ PRICE AND QUANTITY COMPETITION WITH ASYMMETRIC COSTS IN A MIXED DUOPOLY: A TECHNICAL NOTE ⋮ Vertical product differentiation, managerial delegation and social welfare in a vertically-related market ⋮ Wholesale pricing and evolutionary stable strategies of retailers under network externality ⋮ On the coalitional stability of monopoly power in differentiated Bertrand and Cournot oligopolies ⋮ Network compatibility, intensity of competition and process R\&D: a generalization ⋮ Strategic delegation under fulfilled expectations

Cites Work

• Comparing Cournot and Bertrand in a homogeneous product market
• A note on price and quantity competition in differentiated oligopolies
• Strategic delegation under price competition and network effects

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