Cournot vs. Bertrand under relative performance delegation: implications of positive and negative network externalities
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Cites work
Cited in
(20)- Collusion in a differentiated duopoly with network externalities
- Wholesale pricing and evolutionary stable strategies of retailers under network externality
- Strategic delegation under fulfilled expectations
- On the coalitional stability of monopoly power in differentiated Bertrand and Cournot oligopolies
- Network compatibility, intensity of competition and process R\&D: a generalization
- Network externalities and process R\&D: a Cournot-Bertrand comparison
- Downstream rivals' competition, bargaining, and welfare
- Vertical product differentiation, managerial delegation and social welfare in a vertically-related market
- Choosing price or quantity? The role of delegation and network externalities
- Equilibrium further studied for combined system of Cournot and Bertrand: a differential approach
- Endogenous expectations management with network effects: a note
- Price and quantity competition with asymmetric costs in a mixed duopoly: a technical note
- Network externalities in a vertically differentiated luxury goods market
- The co-determination decision game with consumption externalities
- Cross-ownership and managerial delegation under vertical product differentiation
- Dynamics of Cournot and Bertrand firms: exploring imitation and replicator processes
- Network investments under different consumer expectations and competition modes
- Cross-ownership in duopoly: are there any incentives to divest?
- Pro-competitive horizontal merger with cost reducing investments and network externalities
- Collusive stability with relative performance and network externalities
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