On the coalitional stability of monopoly power in differentiated Bertrand and Cournot oligopolies
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2011371
Recommendations
- On the existence and stability of equilibria in N-firm Cournot-Bertrand oligopolies
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5309835
- STABILITY OF EQUILIBRIUM IN BERTRAND AND COURNOT DUOPOLIES
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4062776
- The stability of the Cournot oligopoly model: a reassessment
- On the stability of oligopoly model with a Cournot fringe
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4185350
- On stability and persistence of some oligopoly models
- Coalition-proof supply function equilibria in oligopoly.
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3139273 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1929535 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
- A \(\beta\)-core existence result and its application to oligopoly markets
- A note on price and quantity competition in differentiated oligopolies
- Comparing Cournot and Bertrand in a homogeneous product market
- Convexity of Bertrand oligopoly TU-games with differentiated products
- Cooperative oligopoly games with boundedly rational firms
- Core existence in vertically differentiated markets
- Cournot vs. Bertrand under relative performance delegation: implications of positive and negative network externalities
- Endogenous Coalition Formation in Cooperative Oligopolies
- Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
- Equilibrium binding agreements
- Equilibrium prices in the Bertrand and Cournot oligopolies
- N‐person games in partition function form
- Oligopoly games with and without transferable technologies.
- On the efficiency of Bertrand and Cournot equilibria with product differentiation
- Optimal deterrence of cooperation
- Stability analysis of horizontal mergers in a market with asymmetric substitutability
- Stable coalition structures with externalities
- The \(\gamma \)-core in Cournot oligopoly TU-games with capacity constraints
- The aggregate-monotonic core
- The bargaining problem
- The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities
- The equilibria of a multiple objective game
- The relative interior of the base polyhedron and the core
- Why are firms sometimes unwilling to reduce costs?
Cited in
(2)
This page was built for publication: On the coalitional stability of monopoly power in differentiated Bertrand and Cournot oligopolies
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2011371)