On the coalitional stability of monopoly power in differentiated Bertrand and Cournot oligopolies
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Publication:2011371
DOI10.1007/S11238-019-09720-9zbMATH Open1428.91012OpenAlexW2613495040MaRDI QIDQ2011371FDOQ2011371
Publication date: 6 December 2019
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-019-09720-9
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