On the sustainability of collusion in differentiated duopolies

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(92)90241-PzbMath0775.90131OpenAlexW2073457824WikidataQ114203932 ScholiaQ114203932MaRDI QIDQ2366921

R. Rothschild

Publication date: 23 August 1993

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(92)90241-p

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (6)

Prisoners' dilemma in duopoly (super) games ⋮ Standardization and the stability of collusion ⋮ Collusion in differentiated duopolies revisited ⋮ Cost-based access regulation and collusion in a differentiated duopoly ⋮ Price or quantity in tacit collusion? ⋮ Optimal punishments in linear duopoly supergames with product differentiation

Cites Work

• Duopoly supergames with product differentiation
• Price vs. quantity competition in oligopoly supergames
• Extremal equlibria of oligopolistic supergames
• Renegotiation in repeated games

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