Cost-based access regulation and collusion in a differentiated duopoly

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2009.11.012zbMATH Open1203.91155OpenAlexW1992758872MaRDI QIDQ969490FDOQ969490

Authors: Edmond Baranes, Jean-Christophe Poudou 

Publication date: 7 May 2010

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2009.11.012

Recommendations

• Tacit collusion in differentiated Cournot games
• Sustainable collusion on separate markets
• Revisiting dynamic duopoly with consumer switching costs
• Collusion in a differentiated duopoly with network externalities
• Taxation and the sustainability of collusion with asymmetric costs

zbMATH Keywords

regulationcollusionvertical structureaccess

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Cites Work

• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
• Duopoly supergames with product differentiation
• Entry, access pricing, and welfare in the telecommunications industry
• Bill-and-keep vs. cost-based access pricing revisited
• On the sustainability of collusion in differentiated duopolies

Cited In (6)

• Access pricing and exclusionary behavior
• Regional Bell Operating Company entry into long‐distance and non‐price discrimination against rival interexchange carriers: empirical evidence from panel data
• Excess Capacity and Collusion
• Backward integration and collusion in a duopoly model with asymmetric costs
• Understanding and preventing tacit collusion among telecommunication operators
• Sustainable collusion on separate markets

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