Cost-based access regulation and collusion in a differentiated duopoly

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2009.11.012zbMath1203.91155OpenAlexW1992758872MaRDI QIDQ969490

Jean-Christophe Poudou, Edmond Baranes

Publication date: 7 May 2010

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2009.11.012

zbMATH Keywords

regulationcollusionvertical structureaccess

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Cites Work

• Duopoly supergames with product differentiation
• Entry, access pricing, and welfare in the telecommunications industry
• Bill-and-keep vs. cost-based access pricing revisited
• On the sustainability of collusion in differentiated duopolies
• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames

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