Cost-based access regulation and collusion in a differentiated duopoly

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2009.11.012MaRDI QIDQ969490zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Edmond Baranes, Jean-Christophe Poudou

Publication date 7 May 2010

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2009.11.012

zbMATH Keywords

regulationcollusionvertical structureaccess

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Recommendations

• Tacit collusion in differentiated Cournot games
• Sustainable collusion on separate markets
• Revisiting dynamic duopoly with consumer switching costs
• Collusion in a differentiated duopoly with network externalities
• Taxation and the sustainability of collusion with asymmetric costs

Cites work

• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
• Bill-and-keep vs. cost-based access pricing revisited
• Duopoly supergames with product differentiation
• Entry, access pricing, and welfare in the telecommunications industry
• On the sustainability of collusion in differentiated duopolies

Cited in

(6)

• Backward integration and collusion in a duopoly model with asymmetric costs
• Excess Capacity and Collusion
• Understanding and preventing tacit collusion among telecommunication operators
• Access pricing and exclusionary behavior
• Sustainable collusion on separate markets
• Regional Bell Operating Company entry into long‐distance and non‐price discrimination against rival interexchange carriers: empirical evidence from panel data

This page was built for publication: Cost-based access regulation and collusion in a differentiated duopoly

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q969490)