Sustainable collusion on separate markets

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2007.09.020zbMATH Open1255.91198OpenAlexW2128824638MaRDI QIDQ1934776FDOQ1934776

Authors: Paul Belleflamme, Francis Bloch 

Publication date: 29 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2007.09.020

Recommendations

• Tacit collusion and market concentration under network effects
• Taxation and the sustainability of collusion with asymmetric costs
• Cost-based access regulation and collusion in a differentiated duopoly
• Collusion in a differentiated duopoly with network externalities
• Tacit collusion in differentiated Cournot games

zbMATH Keywords

implicit collusionoptimal punishmentmarket sharing agreementsproduction quotas

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80)

Cites Work

• Extremal equlibria of oligopolistic supergames

Cited In (13)

• Targeting market neutrality
• Cost-based access regulation and collusion in a differentiated duopoly
• Extended decision field theory with social-learning for long-term decision-making processes in social networks
• Fighting collusion by permitting price discrimination
• Multi-product supply networks: implications of intermediaries
• Collusion and Price Rigidity
• Collusion between non-differentiated two-sided platforms
• Heterogeneous firms can always collude on a minimum price
• Can labor markets help resolve collusion?
• A dynamic analysis of collusive networks
• Taxation and the sustainability of collusion with asymmetric costs
• Competition and collusion with fixed output
• Tacit collusion and market concentration under network effects

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