Prisoners' dilemma in duopoly (super) games

DOI10.1006/jeth.1997.2328zbMath0892.90025MaRDI QIDQ1381983

Luca Lambertini

Publication date: 1 April 1998

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://amsacta.unibo.it/5047/1/264.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

collusion; prisoners' dilemma; oligopoly game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B24: Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets)

91A40: Other game-theoretic models

91A20: Multistage and repeated games

Related Items

PRIVATE AND SOCIAL INCENTIVES TOWARDS INVESTMENT IN PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION, Generalizing Pure and Impure Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemmas to the Case of Infinite and Infinitesimal Quantities, Price vs. quantity competition in a vertically related market, Standardization and the stability of collusion, Optimal punishments in linear duopoly supergames with product differentiation, Price or quantity in tacit collusion?, The choice of prices versus quantities under outsourcing, Non-Archimedean game theory: a numerical approach

Cites Work

• Duopoly supergames with product differentiation
• Price vs. quantity competition in oligopoly supergames
• On the efficiency of Bertrand and Cournot equilibria with product differentiation
• Extremal equlibria of oligopolistic supergames
• Price competition in a capacity-constrained duopoly
• Equilibrium prices in the Bertrand and Cournot oligopolies
• Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or Cournot equilibria
• On the sustainability of collusion in differentiated duopolies
• Optimal Penal Codes in Price-setting Supergames with Capacity Constraints
• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
• Price Duopoly and Capacity Constraints