Pricing and coordination: Strategically stable equilibria

DOI10.1016/0899-8256(90)90025-PzbMATH Open0754.90083OpenAlexW2081489611MaRDI QIDQ1193753FDOQ1193753

Authors: S. Singh 

Publication date: 27 September 1992

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(90)90025-p

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zbMATH Keywords

prisoner's dilemmacoordination gamestable setstwo-period games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice
• Stable equilibria and forward induction
• Pricing and coordination: Strategically stable equilibria
• Signaling, forward induction, and stability in finitely repeated games

Cited In (12)

• Robust pricing under strategic trading
• AN EQUILIBRIUM GUIDE TO DESIGNING AFFINE PRICING MODELS
• Inefficient stage Nash is not stable
• Convergence of strategic behavior to price taking
• Signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice
• Coordination of Pricing and Multiple-Period Production Across Multiple Constant Priced Goods
• Strategic bidding in price coupled regions
• Equilibria in a dynamic model of coordination of two firms with nonfixed prices
• Existence of coordinating prices in dynamic systems
• On the possibility of price wars when firms use a `tit-for-tat' strategy
• Sustainable positive profit multiple-price strategies in contestable markets
• Pricing and coordination: Strategically stable equilibria

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