Wait or act now? Learning dynamics in stopping games

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2022.105541MaRDI QIDQ2095262zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Mehmet Ekmekci, Lucas Maestri

Publication date 9 November 2022

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105541

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic gamesimperfect monitoringreputation dynamics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Dynamic games (91A25) Games of timing (91A55) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Recommendations

• Delay and information aggregation in stopping games with private information
• Experimentation with reputation concerns -- dynamic signalling with changing types
• Reputation in dynamic games
• Learning, belief manipulation and optimal relationship termination
• Reputation with noisy precommitment

Cites work

• Bargaining with Interdependent Values
• Dynamic contracting with limited commitment and the ratchet effect
• Foundations of dynamic monopoly and the Coase conjecture
• Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
• Progressive learning
• Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns
• Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
• Reputation effects under interdependent values
• Reputation in continuous-time games
• Reputation in long-run relationships
• Reputation in the long-run with imperfect monitoring
• Reputation with equal discounting in repeated games with strictly conflicting interests
• Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms1
• Simple bounds on the value of a reputation
• The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts
• Value of Persistent Information

Cited in

(2)

• Experimentation with reputation concerns -- dynamic signalling with changing types
• Delay and information aggregation in stopping games with private information

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