Wait or act now? Learning dynamics in stopping games
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2095262
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2022.105541zbMATH Open1504.91053OpenAlexW4294190653WikidataQ114160449 ScholiaQ114160449MaRDI QIDQ2095262FDOQ2095262
Authors: Mehmet Ekmekci, Lucas Maestri
Publication date: 9 November 2022
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105541
Recommendations
Cites Work
- Foundations of dynamic monopoly and the Coase conjecture
- Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns
- Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms1
- Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
- Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
- Reputation in long-run relationships
- Reputation in the long-run with imperfect monitoring
- Reputation with equal discounting in repeated games with strictly conflicting interests
- Bargaining with Interdependent Values
- The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts
- Simple bounds on the value of a reputation
- Reputation in continuous-time games
- Dynamic contracting with limited commitment and the ratchet effect
- Value of Persistent Information
- Reputation effects under interdependent values
- Progressive learning
Cited In (2)
This page was built for publication: Wait or act now? Learning dynamics in stopping games
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2095262)