Strategic inattention in the Sir Philip Sidney Game

DOI10.1101/559955MaRDI QIDQ2225985zbMATHOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Mark Whitmeyer

Publication date 11 February 2021

Published in Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2020.110513

zbMATH Keywords

costly signalinghandicap theoryinformation designstrategic inattention

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Animal behavior (92D50) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Recommendations

• Strategic Transmission of Costly Information
• Signaling private choices
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Signalling among relatives. II: Beyond the tower of Babel
• Informal communication

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2017728 (Why is no real title available?)
• Dishonest signalling in a variant of pygmalion game
• Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Signalling among relatives. II: Beyond the tower of Babel
• Some dynamics of signaling games
• Strategic Information Transmission
• The dynamics of costly signaling

Cited in

(2)

• Informative tests in signaling environments
• Strategic absentmindedness in finitely repeated games

This page was built for publication: Strategic inattention in the Sir Philip Sidney Game

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2225985)