Strategic inattention in the Sir Philip Sidney Game

DOI10.1101/559955zbMATH Open1457.91102OpenAlexW3093137717WikidataQ100733173 ScholiaQ100733173MaRDI QIDQ2225985FDOQ2225985

Authors: Mark Whitmeyer 

Publication date: 11 February 2021

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2020.110513

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zbMATH Keywords

costly signalinghandicap theoryinformation designstrategic inattention

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Animal behavior (92D50) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Strategic Information Transmission
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Signalling among relatives. II: Beyond the tower of Babel
• The dynamics of costly signaling
• Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
• Dishonest signalling in a variant of pygmalion game
• Some dynamics of signaling games

Cited In (2)

• Strategic absentmindedness in finitely repeated games
• Informative tests in signaling environments

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