Comparative cheap talk

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2005.07.003MaRDI QIDQ869851zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Archishman Chakraborty, Rick Harbaugh

Publication date 9 March 2007

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.07.003

zbMATH Keywords

complementaritiesmultidimensional cheap talk

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Recommendations

• Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
• Cheap Talk With Transparent Motives
• Cheap talk comparisons in multi-issue bargaining
• Multi-period competitive cheap talk with highly biased experts
• Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 765034 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Theory of Credibility
• Authority and Communication in Organizations
• Cheap talk comparisons in multi-issue bargaining
• Co-ordination, spillovers, and cheap talk
• Long Cheap Talk
• Monotone Comparative Statics under Uncertainty
• Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
• Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions
• Rational Debate and One-Dimensional Conflict*
• Strategic Information Transmission
• The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication

Cited in

(29)

• Cheap talk about the relevance of multiple aspects
• Signaling games
• Competitive cheap talk
• Agenda control as a cheap talk game: theory and experiments with storable votes
• Strategic transmission of imperfect information: why revealing evidence (without proof) is difficult
• Cheap talk with coarse understanding
• Pervasive signaling
• Optimal delegation with multi-dimensional decisions
• Signaling games in multiple dimensions: geometric properties of equilibrium solutions
• When to ask for an update: timing in strategic communication
• Strategic information transmission despite conflict
• An experimental analysis of multidimensional cheap talk
• Self-enforced collusion through comparative cheap talk in simultaneous auctions with entry
• Discounted quotas
• Bayesian persuasion with cheap talk
• Cheap talk can matter in bargaining
• Cheap talk comparisons in multi-issue bargaining
• Voting on multiple issues: what to put on the ballot?
• Information transmission in persuasion models with imperfect verification
• Stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: the regular case
• Game-theoretic pragmatics under conflicting and common interests
• Disagreement and evidence production in strategic information transmission
• Cheap talk and editorial control
• Cheap CTL compassion in NuSMV
• Cross-verification and persuasive cheap talk
• The economics of excuses: job market cheap talk with pre-employment tests
• Stress tests and information disclosure
• Rational exaggeration and counter-exaggeration in information aggregation games
• Multi-period competitive cheap talk with highly biased experts

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