Bayesian persuasion with cheap talk

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2018.06.006MaRDI QIDQ1787711zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Vasudha Jain

Publication date 5 October 2018

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.06.006

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian persuasioncheap talkgrading policymultidimensionalitypartial commitment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Recommendations

• Bayesian persuasion with costly messages
• Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender
• Cheap Talk With Transparent Motives
• Bayesian persuasion under partial commitment
• Bayesian persuasion with costly information acquisition

Cites work

• Comparative cheap talk
• Grading exams: 100,99,98,\(\dots \) or \(A,B,C\)?
• On the Limits of Communication in Multidimensional Cheap Talk: A Comment
• Strategic Information Transmission

Cited in

(8)

• Optimal signaling with cheap talk and money burning
• The value of mediated communication
• Bayesian persuasion with costly messages
• Bayesian persuasion under partial commitment
• Cheap talk with private signal structures
• Probabilistic cheap talk
• Conveying value via categories
• Cross-verification and persuasive cheap talk

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