Cross-verification and persuasive cheap talk

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2024.105934MaRDI QIDQ6664599FDOQ6664599

Authors: Alp E. Atakan, Mehmet Ekmekci, Ludovic Renou 

Publication date: 16 January 2025

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

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zbMATH Keywords

commitmentcheap talkBayesian persuasioninformation designmultiple experts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical economics (91Bxx)

Cites Work

• Linear and nonlinear programming.
• Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
• On Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders
• Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
• Competition in persuasion
• Competitive information disclosure by multiple senders
• Sequential persuasion
• Interactive information design
• Robustness of full revelation in multisender cheap talk

Cited In (1)

• Rules and commitment in communication: an experimental analysis

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