Cross-verification and persuasive cheap talk

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2024.105934MaRDI QIDQ6664599zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Alp E. Atakan, Mehmet Ekmekci, Ludovic Renou

Publication date 16 January 2025

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.JET.2024.105934

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian persuasioncheap talkcommitmentinformation designmultiple experts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical economics (91Bxx)

Recommendations

• Cheap Talk With Transparent Motives
• Comparative cheap talk
• Communication with partially verifiable information: an experiment
• Should the talk be cheap in contribution games?
• Bayesian persuasion with cheap talk

Cites work

• Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
• Competition in persuasion
• Competitive information disclosure by multiple senders
• Interactive information design
• Linear and nonlinear programming.
• Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
• On Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders
• Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns
• Robustness of full revelation in multisender cheap talk
• Sequential persuasion
• Strategic Information Transmission

Cited in

(1)

• Rules and commitment in communication: an experimental analysis

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