Dynamic sender-receiver games

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2012.07.006MaRDI QIDQ1945834zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jérôme Renault, Eilon Solan, Nicolas Vieille

Publication date 17 April 2013

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1204.0323

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian gamescommunicationdynamic gamesrepeated gamessender-receiver

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Abstract: We consider a dynamic version of sender-receiver games, where the sequence of states follows an irreducible Markov chain observed by the sender. Under mild assumptions, we provide a simple characterization of the limit set of equilibrium payoffs, as players become very patient. Under these assumptions, the limit set depends on the Markov chain only through its invariant measure. The (limit) equilibrium payoffs are the feasible payoffs that satisfy an individual rationality condition for the receiver, and an incentive compatibility condition for the sender.

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Cited in

(24)

• Equilibrium refinements in sender-receiver games
• Dynamic communication with biased senders
• Cooperation dynamics in repeated games of adverse selection
• Neighborhood stability in sender-receiver games
• Optimal dynamic information provision
• On the value of repetition for communication games
• Goodwill in communication
• Starting small to communicate
• On the cardinality of the message space in sender-receiver games
• Markov games with frequent actions and incomplete information -- the limit case
• Dynamic strategic information transmission
• Unraveling in a repeated moral hazard model with multiple agents
• Repeated games with incomplete information
• Dynamic delegation with a persistent state
• Repeated communication with private lying costs
• The battle of opinion: dynamic information revelation by ideological senders
• Incentive compatibility in sender-receiver stopping games
• Shannon meets Myerson: information extraction from a strategic sender
• Speak or wait: strategic delay and the value of public information
• Marginal reputation
• Dynamic communication with trading commissions
• Insurance and inequality with persistent private information
• Continuous-time persuasion by filtering
• Approximate implementation in Markovian environments

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