On the cardinality of the message space in sender-receiver games

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2020.07.001zbMATH Open1448.91057OpenAlexW3045029012MaRDI QIDQ2201708FDOQ2201708

Authors: Tibor Heumann 

Publication date: 17 September 2020

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.07.001

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zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationsender-receiver gamesmechanism design with limited commitment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Spaces of games (91A70) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
• Nonzero-Sum Two-Person Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
• Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
• Long Cheap Talk
• Strategic approximations of discontinuous games
• A user's guide to measure theoretic probability
• Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case
• Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication
• Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: The multi-agent case
• Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: the multi-agent case with transferable utility

Cited In (1)

• Communication with endogenous deception costs

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