Starting small to communicate
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Cites work
- A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information About Time Preferences
- A Theory of Credibility
- A model of expertise
- A political theory of populism
- Bad Reputation
- Building rational cooperation
- Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information
- Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project
- Dynamic communication with biased senders
- Dynamic sender-receiver games
- Dynamic strategic information transmission
- Informative cheap talk in elections
- Location and ownership of public goods
- Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
- Markov perfect equilibrium. I: Observable actions
- Professional advice
- Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria
- Starting small and commitment
- Starting small and renegotiation
- Strategic Information Transmission
- Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games
- Using Privileged Information to Manipulate Markets: Insiders, Gurus, and Credibility
- When mandatory disclosure hurts: Expert advice and conflicting interests
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