Building rational cooperation

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2004.09.002MaRDI QIDQ2491031zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors James Andreoni, Larry Samuelson

Publication date 18 May 2006

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2004.09.002

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationprisoners' dilemmareciprocitystarting small

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Experimental studies (91A90)

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Cites work

• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game
• Giving According to GARP: An Experimental Test of the Consistency of Preferences for Altruism
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1907684 (Why is no real title available?)
• Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
• Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Reputation and imperfect information
• Sophisticated experience-weighted attraction learning and strategic teaching in repeated games
• Starting small and commitment
• Starting small and renegotiation
• Trust, reciprocity, and social history

Cited in

(15)

• Incremental approaches to establishing trust
• Equilibrium cooperation in two-stage games: Experimental evidence
• Evolution of repeated prisoner's dilemma play under logit dynamics
• Starting small to communicate
• Understanding outcome bias
• Building trust -- one gift at a time
• Plausible cooperation
• Are we nice(r) to nice(r) people?-an experimental analysis
• Cooperation and distributive conflict
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1054716 (Why is no real title available?)
• Cooperation, dialogue and ethics
• Fostering cooperation through the enhancement of own vulnerability
• At-will relationships: how an option to walk away affects cooperation and efficiency
• Population interference in panel experiments
• A new approach to the analysis of cooperation under the shadow of the future: theory and experimental evidence

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