Valuable cheap talk and equilibrium selection

DOI10.3390/g11030034zbMath1457.91099OpenAlexW1565526647MaRDI QIDQ2221290

Julian C. Jamison

Publication date: 26 January 2021

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g11030034

zbMATH Keywords

strategic communicationbelief formationtwo-stage gamesPareto efficient equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (1)

Editorial. New directions in behavioral game theory: introduction to the special issue

Cites Work

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• Communication-proof equilibria in cheap-talk games
• Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium
• Universal Mechanisms
• Learning How to Cooperate: Optimal Play in Repeated Coordination Games
• Strategic Information Transmission
• The Evolution of Conventions

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