Forward induction in coordination games

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(92)90217-MMaRDI QIDQ1801823zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Russell Cooper, Douglas V. DeJong, Robert Forsythe, Thomas W. Ross

Publication date 11 August 1993

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(92)90217-m

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Economics of information (91B44)

Cites work

• Coordinating Coordination Failures in Keynesian Models
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4091137 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 47120 (Why is no real title available?)
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Stable equilibria and forward induction

Cited in

(9)

• Limitations of dominance and forward induction:
• Conventions and local interaction structures: experimental evidence.
• On the strategic value of `shooting yourself in the foot': an experimental study of burning money
• Improving coordination in small-scale multi-agent deep reinforcement learning through memory-driven communication
• Valuable cheap talk and equilibrium selection
• Burning money and (pseudo) first-mover advantages: an experimental study on forward induction
• Forward induction and entry deterrence: an experiment
• Coordination via delay: theory and experiment
• Delegation using forward induction

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