On the strategic value of `shooting yourself in the foot': an experimental study of burning money
From MaRDI portal
(Redirected from Publication:2178637)
Recommendations
- Burning money and (pseudo) first-mover advantages: an experimental study on forward induction
- How burning money requires a lot of rationality to be effective
- Multi-sided pre-play communication by burning money
- Money talks? An experimental investigation of cheap talk and burned money
- Do people make strategic commitments? Experimental evidence on strategic information avoidance
Cites work
- Asset markets as an equilibrium selection mechanism: Coordination failure, game form auctions, and tacit communication
- Burning money and (pseudo) first-mover advantages: an experimental study on forward induction
- Forward induction in coordination games
- Limitations of dominance and forward induction:
- Multi-sided pre-play communication by burning money
- On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
- Shaping beliefs in experimental markets for expert services: guilt aversion and the impact of promises and money-burning options
- Signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice
- Stable equilibria and forward induction
- Strategic sophistication and attention in games: an eye-tracking study
- The control of game form recognition in experiments: Understanding dominant strategy failures in a simple two person ``guessing game
Cited in
(4)
This page was built for publication: On the strategic value of `shooting yourself in the foot': an experimental study of burning money
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2178637)
