Forward induction and entry deterrence: an experiment

DOI10.1007/S00199-006-0145-ZzbMATH Open1122.91024OpenAlexW2152510982MaRDI QIDQ2642878FDOQ2642878

Authors: Jordi Brandts, Antonio Cabrales, Gary Charness 

Publication date: 6 September 2007

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/3996

Recommendations

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zbMATH Keywords

ExperimentEntryFirst-mover advantageForward inductionEquilibrium selectionCapacity investment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Dynamic games (91A25) Experimental studies (91A90) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Cites Work

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Cited In (7)

• Forward induction and entry deterrence: an experiment
• What makes cheap talk effective? Experimental evidence
• Forward induction and market entry with an endogenous outside option
• Bargaining over strategies of non-cooperative games
• A unified approach to comparative statics puzzles in experiments
• Coordination via delay: theory and experiment
• FAILING FIRM DEFENCE WITH ENTRY DETERRENCE

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