Forward induction and entry deterrence: an experiment
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Publication:2642878
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Cites work
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Cited in
(7)- Bargaining over strategies of non-cooperative games
- What makes cheap talk effective? Experimental evidence
- Forward induction and entry deterrence: an experiment
- Coordination via delay: theory and experiment
- FAILING FIRM DEFENCE WITH ENTRY DETERRENCE
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