A model of expertise
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(96)- Aggregation of expert opinions
- Eliciting socially optimal rankings from unfair jurors
- A model of reporting and controlling outbreaks by public health agencies
- Competition and uncertainty in a paper's news desk
- Bertrand oligopoly with boundedly rational consumers
- On the optimality of diverse expert panels in persuasion games
- Equilibrium informativeness in veto games
- Hiding information in electoral competition.
- Eliciting information from multiple experts
- The organization of expertise in the presence of communication
- Dynamic expert incentives in teams
- Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
- Information transmission and inefficient lobbying
- Receiver's sensitivity and strategic information transmission in multi-sender cheap talk
- Aggregating experts' opinions to select the winner of a competition
- Biased experts, majority rule, and the optimal composition of committee
- Meet meets join: the interaction between pooled and common knowledge
- Designing communication hierarchies
- Competitive disclosure of correlated information
- Cheap talk with private signal structures
- Delegation and information disclosure with unforeseen contingencies
- The value of uncertainty in determining an expert's source of expertise
- Two-sided strategic information transmission
- Starting small to communicate
- Vagueness in multidimensional proposals
- (Not) delegating decisions to experts: the effect of uncertainty
- Cheap talk games with two-senders and different modes of communication
- Expert advising under checks and balances
- Committee, expert advice, and the weighted majority algorithm: an application to the pricing decision of a monopolist
- Stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: the regular case
- The limited value of a second opinion: competition and exaggeration in experimental cheap talk games
- Should straw polls be banned?
- Competitive information disclosure by multiple senders
- A mathematical model of communication with reputational concerns
- Transfer of authority within hierarchies
- Cheap talk when the receiver has uncertain information sources
- Sequential cheap talks
- Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders
- An experimental analysis of multidimensional cheap talk
- Rational exaggeration and counter-exaggeration in information aggregation games
- Too good to be truthful: why competent advisers are fired
- How to consult an expert? Opinion versus evidence
- Optimal delegation via a strategic intermediary
- When mandatory disclosure hurts: Expert advice and conflicting interests
- On the informational content of advice: a theoretical and experimental study
- Competitive cheap talk
- Cheap talk with two senders and complementary information
- Expert panels with selective investigation
- Cheap talk with multiple experts and uncertain biases
- Cheap talk about the detection probability
- Union leaders as experts: wage bargaining and strikes with union-wide ballot requirements
- Dynamic learning and strategic communication
- Dynamic strategic information transmission
- Strategic information transmission networks
- Eliciting information from a committee
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1304262 (Why is no real title available?)
- Optimal delegation with multi-dimensional decisions
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1560548 (Why is no real title available?)
- Non-exclusive financial advice
- Experts, conflicts of interest, and reputation for ability
- Cheap talk and editorial control
- Multidimensional cheap talk with sequential messages
- Coordination-free equilibria in cheap talk games
- A manipulation game based on Machiavellian strategies
- Signaling games
- Sequential expert advice: superiority of closed-door meetings
- Multi-period competitive cheap talk with highly biased experts
- How to talk to multiple audiences
- Why do people place lower weight on advice far from their own initial opinion?
- Debates and decisions: On a rationale of argumentation rules.
- Quid pro quo: Friendly information exchange between rivals
- Influential news and policy-making
- Court‐appointed experts and accuracy in adversarial litigation
- When to seek expert advice? A simple model of borrowers with limited liability
- Competition in costly talk
- Evaluation and strategic manipulation
- Sequential Bayesian persuasion
- Cognitive limits and preferences for information
- The battle of opinion: dynamic information revelation by ideological senders
- Almost-truthful interim-biased mediation enables information exchange between agents with misaligned interests
- Information revelation and coordination using cheap talk in a game with two-sided private information
- Independent versus collective expertise
- Resilient Information Aggregation
- Strategic argumentation
- When to stop consulting
- Cheap talk with two-sided private information
- Organizing expertise
- Investing in influence: how minority interests can prevail in a democracy
- Asymptotic full revelation in cheap talk with many senders
- The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication
- When can an outsider bribe voters one by one at a negligible cost?
- Evolving influence: mitigating extreme conflicts of interest in advisory relationships
- Talking to influence
- The importance of expertise in group decisions
- Learning under supervision: an experimental study
- Informational control and organizational design
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