Cheap talk with two-sided private information
From MaRDI portal
Recommendations
- Two-sided strategic information transmission
- Cheap talk with private signal structures
- Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders
- The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication
- Information transmission when the sender's preferences are uncertain.
Cites work
- A model of expertise
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- A two-person game of information transmission
- Authority and Communication in Organizations
- Communication between rational agents
- Effective cheap talk with conflicting interests
- Informal communication
- Information Acquisition in Auctions
- Information transmission when the informed party is confused
- Information transmission when the sender's preferences are uncertain.
- Informational control and organizational design
- Interested experts and policy advice: Multiple referrals under open rule
- Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games
- Mediation, arbitration and negotiation
- Monotone Comparative Statics
- Monotone Comparative Statics under Uncertainty
- Optimal Delegation
- Optimal information disclosure: a linear programming approach
- Refining cheap-talk equilibria
- Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria
- Stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: the regular case
- Strategic Information Transmission
- Strategic information transmission networks
- The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication
- Value of public information in sender-receiver games
- When mandatory disclosure hurts: Expert advice and conflicting interests
Cited in
(2)
This page was built for publication: Cheap talk with two-sided private information
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6665670)
