Refining cheap-talk equilibria
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Cites work
- Communication between rational agents
- Credible negotiation statements and coherent plans
- Effective cheap talk with conflicting interests
- Efficient trading mechanisms with pre-play communication
- Equilibria with Communication in a Job Market Example
- Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
- Interested experts and policy advice: Multiple referrals under open rule
- Justifiable Beliefs in Sequential Equilibrium
- Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games
- On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
- Perfect sequential equilibrium
- Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
- Strategic Information Transmission
- Veto Threats: Rhetoric in a Bargaining Game
Cited in
(36)- Equilibrium refinement vs. level-\(k\) analysis: An experimental study of cheap-talk games with private information
- Cheap talk can matter in bargaining
- Meaningful cheap talk must improve equilibrium payoffs
- Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games
- Credible proposals in communication games
- Generic finiteness of equilibrium outcome distributions for sender-receiver cheap-talk games
- Communication-proof equilibria in cheap-talk games
- Believing when credible: talking about future intentions and past actions
- Language and coordination games
- Self-rejecting mechanisms
- Lies and consequences. The effect of lie detection on communication outcomes
- Maximal miscommunication
- Equilibrium selection in experimental cheap talk games
- Not so cheap talk: costly and discrete communication
- Communication in bargaining over decision rights
- Rich language and refinements of cheap-talk equilibria
- Persuasion with communication costs
- Good manners: signaling social preferences
- Cheap talk with two senders and complementary information
- Equilibrium selection through forward induction in cheap talk games
- Random authority
- Meaning and credibility in experimental cheap-talk games
- Cheap Talk With Endogenous Conflict of Interest
- Coordination-free equilibria in cheap talk games
- Signaling games
- Meet the lemons: an experiment on how cheap-talk overcomes adverse selection in decentralized markets
- Credible deviations from signaling equilibria
- Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers
- Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria
- Completely fair SFE and coalition-safe cheap talk
- Evolutions of communication with partial common interest
- Cheap talk with two-sided private information
- Informal communication
- Game-theoretic pragmatics under conflicting and common interests
- Communication between rational agents
- A ``super folk theorem for dynastic repeated games
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