Coordination-free equilibria in cheap talk games
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Publication:508394
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2016.12.004zbMATH Open1400.91111OpenAlexW2182464862MaRDI QIDQ508394FDOQ508394
Publication date: 10 February 2017
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://summit.sfu.ca/item/18388
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Cites Work
- An experimental analysis of multidimensional cheap talk
- A model of expertise
- Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Strategic Information Transmission
- Authority and Communication in Organizations
- Communication with multiple senders: An experiment
- Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
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- A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements
- Optimal Delegation
- Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria
- Communication via a strategic mediator
- Epsilon-equilibria of perturbed games
- Approximate robustness of equilibrium to incomplete information
- Robust equilibria under non-common priors
- Hierarchical cheap talk
- Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders
- Multidimensional cheap talk with sequential messages
- Refining cheap-talk equilibria
Cited In (11)
- Neutrally stable outcomes in cheap-talk coordination games
- Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders
- Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
- Cheap talk and cooperation in Stackelberg games
- Co-ordination, spillovers, and cheap talk
- Effective cheap talk with conflicting interests
- Equilibrium refinement vs. level-\(k\) analysis: An experimental study of cheap-talk games with private information
- Cheap play with no regret
- An experimental analysis of multidimensional cheap talk
- Equilibrium selection through forward induction in cheap talk games
- Coordination and weak announcement proofness: Two comments on ``Refining cheap-talk equilibria
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