Coordination-free equilibria in cheap talk games
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Publication:508394
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3141365 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements
- A model of expertise
- Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders
- An experimental analysis of multidimensional cheap talk
- Approximate robustness of equilibrium to incomplete information
- Authority and Communication in Organizations
- Communication via a strategic mediator
- Communication with multiple senders: an experiment
- Epsilon-equilibria of perturbed games
- Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
- Hierarchical cheap talk
- Multidimensional cheap talk with sequential messages
- Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
- Optimal Delegation
- Refining cheap-talk equilibria
- Robust equilibria under non-common priors
- Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria
- Strategic Information Transmission
- The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information
Cited in
(22)- Sequential cheap talks
- Valuable cheap talk and equilibrium selection
- Ethnic conflicts with informed agents: a cheap talk game with multiple audiences
- Coordination and weak announcement proofness: Two comments on ``Refining cheap-talk equilibria
- Equilibrium selection through forward induction in cheap talk games
- Co-ordination, spillovers, and cheap talk
- Hierarchical cheap talk
- How to talk to multiple audiences
- An experimental analysis of multidimensional cheap talk
- Maximal miscommunication
- Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
- Neutrally stable outcomes in cheap-talk coordination games
- Cheap play with no regret
- Information revelation and coordination using cheap talk in a game with two-sided private information
- A note on optimal cheap talk equilibria in a discrete state space
- Non-uniqueness of equilibrium action profiles with equal size in one-shot cheap-talk games
- Multidimensional cheap talk with sequential messages
- Robustness of full revelation in multisender cheap talk
- Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders
- Cheap talk and cooperation in Stackelberg games
- Effective cheap talk with conflicting interests
- Equilibrium refinement vs. level-\(k\) analysis: An experimental study of cheap-talk games with private information
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