Epsilon-equilibria of perturbed games
From MaRDI portal
Publication:417690
Recommendations
- Perfect conditional \(\varepsilon \)-equilibria of multi-stage games with infinite sets of signals and actions
- Contemporaneous perfect epsilon-equilibria
- The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information
- On the robustness of equilibrium refinements
- Approximation results for discontinuous games with an application to equilibrium refinement
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 47120 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements
- An extension of Tietze's theorem
- Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs
- Collusive behavior in noncooperative epsilon-equilibria of oligopolies with long but finite lives
- Commitment and observability in games
- Common \(p\)-belief: The general case
- Communication and Equilibrium in Discontinuous Games of Incomplete Information
- Contemporaneous perfect epsilon-equilibria
- Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information
- Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities.
- Five legitimate definitions of correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
- Generalized potentials and robust sets of equilibria
- Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
- Large Robust Games
- Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
- Limit games and limit equilibria
- Lower hemicontinuity of the Nash equilibrium correspondence
- On the approximation of measurable functions by continuous functions
- Payoff continuity in incomplete information games
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
- Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
- Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
- The Evolution of Conventions
- Theory of games and economic behavior.
Cited in
(15)- Contemporaneous perfect epsilon-equilibria
- Payoff-dependent mistakes and \(q\)-resistant equilibrium
- The robust selection of rationalizability
- The existence of equilibrium in games with randomly perturbed payoffs and applications to experimental economics
- Equilibrium with strategy-dependent trembles
- Asymptotic behavior of subgame perfect Nash equilibria in Stackelberg games
- The topology of information on the space of probability measures over Polish spaces
- On monotone approximate and exact equilibria of an asymmetric first-price auction with affiliated private information
- A limit theorem for equilibria under ambiguous belief correspondences
- Regularity and robustness in monotone Bayesian games
- Robustness of dynamics in games: a contraction mapping decomposition approach
- Asymmetric auctions: perturbations, \(\varepsilon\)-equilibrium, and equilibrium
- Robustness of equilibria in anonymous local games
- A characterization of quasi-perfect equilibria
- Coordination-free equilibria in cheap talk games
This page was built for publication: Epsilon-equilibria of perturbed games
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q417690)
