Epsilon-equilibria of perturbed games
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Publication:417690
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.09.007zbMATH Open1279.91012OpenAlexW3122879897MaRDI QIDQ417690FDOQ417690
Tomas Rodriguez-Barraquer, Matthew O. Jackson, Xu Tan
Publication date: 14 May 2012
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.09.007
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Cited In (11)
- Contemporaneous perfect epsilon-equilibria
- The robust selection of rationalizability
- Equilibrium with strategy-dependent trembles
- The existence of equilibrium in games with randomly perturbed payoffs and applications to experimental economics
- The topology of information on the space of probability measures over Polish spaces
- On monotone approximate and exact equilibria of an asymmetric first-price auction with affiliated private information
- Robustness of dynamics in games: a contraction mapping decomposition approach
- Regularity and robustness in monotone Bayesian games
- Asymmetric auctions: perturbations, \(\varepsilon\)-equilibrium, and equilibrium
- Coordination-free equilibria in cheap talk games
- Doomsday equilibria for omega-regular games
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