Common p-belief: The general case

DOI10.1006/GAME.1997.0513MaRDI QIDQ1367680zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Bernhard Rupp

Publication date 22 July 1998

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0513

zbMATH Keywords

belief operatorsinformation systems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

Recommendations

• Iterative and fixed point common belief
• Common belief and common knowledge
• Common belief in monotonic epistemic logic
• Approximate common knowledge revisited

Cites work

• ``Impossibility of speculation theorems with noisy information
• Agreeing to disagree
• Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs
• Common knowledge with probability 1
• Common knowledge, communication, and convergence of beliefs
• Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3060775 (Why is no real title available?)
• Stochastic common learning
• The Foundations of Probability

Cited in

(10)

• Common theories
• Tenacious selection of Nash equilibrium
• Public information, private information, and the multiplicity of equilibria in coordination games.
• Approximating agreeing to disagree results with common \(p\)-beliefs
• Epistemic foundations for set-algebraic representations of knowledge
• Cooperation under incomplete information on the discount factors
• On \(p\)-rationalizability and approximate common certainty of rationality
• Contemporary epistemic logic and the Lockean thesis
• Epsilon-equilibria of perturbed games
• On the consistency among prior, posteriors, and information sets

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