Common knowledge with probability 1

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(87)90010-3zbMath0639.90110OpenAlexW2038339254MaRDI QIDQ1100108

Eddie Dekel, Adam Brandenburger

Publication date: 1987

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(87)90010-3

zbMATH Keywords

common knowledgeinformation structureBayesian definitionposterior completed \(\sigma \)-fields

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory (91A99)

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Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
• Common knowledge, communication, and convergence of beliefs
• On existence and non-existence of proper, regular, conditional distributions
• Agreeing to disagree
• Hierarchies of beliefs and common knowledge
• Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
• Sequential Equilibria
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
• Non-Existence of Everywhere Proper Conditional Distributions

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